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INTRODUCTION

Florence Dolan had a problem.' She planned to expand her plumbing
and electrical supply store in Tigard, Oregon, by doubling the size of the
store and paving a 39-space parking lot. 2 However, the City Planning
Commission set as a condition that she dedicate the portion of her land that
lies within a 100-year flood plain of a nearby creek as a greenway, and
dedicate a 15-foot strip of land as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway--a total of
3
7,000 square feet, or nearly 10% of her property. There was to be no
4 Dolan appealed to the Land Use Board
compensation for this allocation.
of Appeals 5 on the grounds that the requirements constituted a taking of her
6
property under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. LUBA, in evaluating the federal takings claim, concluded that there was a sufficiently
"reasonable relationship" between Dolan's planned improvements and the
imposed requirements.7 The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon
Supreme Court affirmed.8 However, the United States Supreme Court held
that the requirements indeed violated the Takings Clause, and therefore
9
reversed the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded the case.
A party such as Dolan, who claims that a federal, state, or municipal
regulation has violated federal constitutional private property rights, faces
a dilemma: choosing between the state court where the judge, probably
elected,' ° may be more likely to enforce the state statute over federal
1.
2.
3.
4.

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
Id. at 2313.
Id. at 2314.
Id.

5. Hereinafter "LUBA."
6. 114S. Ct. at 2315. The Takings Clause states, "nor shall private property be taken

for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.

7. 114 S. Ct. at 2315. LUBA did not define "reasonable relationship;" however, the
Supreme Court did address the term's proper usage.
[W]e do not adopt it [the "reasonable relationship" test] as such, partly
because the term "reasonable relationship" seems confusingly similar to the
term "rational basis" which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think a
term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to be
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.
Id. at 2319-20 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 2315.
9. Id. at 2321-22.
10. Thirty-eight states have some form of judicial election. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
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constitutional rights, and the federal court, which has consistently deferred
to the wisdom of state and federal economic regulatory legislation since
1937.
This judicial environment has encouraged local zoning boards, 2
state legislatures, 3 and Congress 4 to pass regulations and statutes which
have burdened private property rights specifically and economic liberties
generally. 5 Thus, such parties must consider not only issues of ripeness," jurisdiction, and removal, 7 but also which forum is the most

FEDERAL JURISDICTION,

11. See

§1.5, at 34 (2d ed. 1994).

WILLIAM COHEN & JOHNATHAN

D.

VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES

535 (9th ed. 1993). No economic regulatory statute has been invalidated
under the Due Process Clause since 1937, and only in cases where a "taking" was found has
such legislation been invalidated. Id. The Supreme Court has not had a subsequent
opportunity to apply its reasoning in Dolan, and it is unclear how appointments by President
Clinton will influence the Court's approach to private property issues.
12. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Takings at Issue in Land Appeal, A.B.A. J., May
1994, at 20 (discussing the implications of Dolan when the Supreme Court announced its
decision to grant certiorari). For example, San Francisco requires hotel developers to build
child care facilities for hotel employees. Id. at 20.
13. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The Hawaii
Housing Authority created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts of land and for
transferring ownership of the condemned fee simple to existing lessees. Id. at 233. This
measure was intended to remedy the concentration of property in the hands of the few. Id.
at 232-33. The law was challenged as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 231-32.
The district court found the Land Reform Act of 1967 (HAw. REV. STAT. § 516) within the
authority of Hawaii's police powers. 483 F. Supp. 62, 69-70 (D. Haw. 1979). However, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1981). The
Court of Appeals held the Act was "a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to
take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit."
702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court reversed, deferring to the Hawaii
legislature's judgment as to what constitutes public use. 467 U.S. 229, 241. Writing for the
majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ruled that an action under the doctrine of eminent
domain need only be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." Id.
14. Congress has not passed any statutes comparable to the regulations promulgated
by local zoning boards and state legislatures. However, after the New Deal, the Supreme
Court's consideration of almost all economic liberty as being under the mantle of the
commerce clause gave Congress a broad license to regulate economic activity. JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 136 (1992) (reviewing the constitutional protection of property and
arguing that the relegation of property rights to a lesser constitutional status is unwarranted).
15. See generally ELY, supra note 14, at 133; BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980) (focusing primarily on how economic liberties
have fared under the changing approaches to due process).
16. Dolan had the option of bringing a § 1983 action in federal court. As to ripeness,
the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a
prerequisite to a § 1983 action. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
AND MATERIALS
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willing and able to protect their private property rights.
The choice between state and lower federal courts described above-referred to as a question of parity--has been the focal point of considerable
Parity is the question of whether
debate in constitutional scholarship.'
lower federal and state courts are functionally interchangeable in their
likelihood to protect federal constitutional rights.19 In 1977, Professor Burt
Neuborne's article, The Myth of Parity,20 launched a scholarly debate over
parity's existence." At this point, it seems that nothing more can be added
to the discussion and the sides remain divided on this fundamental issue of
the judicial system.22
With the parity debate in the United States at a stalemate, direction may
be found in comparative legal analysis.2" Germany is a prime candidate

17. A claim of a local or state violation can be brought in state court because it is a
court of general jurisdiction, or in federal court assuming federal question or diversity
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (listing the requirements for establishing diversity
jurisdiction); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 247 (discussing the general jurisdiction
of state courts). A claim of a federal violation can be brought in state or federal court, but
if the action is brought in state court, there is the potential of the defendant removing to
federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (specifying the rules for removal from state to federal
court); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) (holding that there
is a presumption of concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts over federal law).
18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary,36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 236 (1988) (reviewing the literature in the parity debate).
19. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977).
20. Id.
21. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 34 (reviewing the literature in the parity
debate).
22. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 236 (arguing that the parity debate is
permanently stalemated); Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a JudicialForum of
Excellence, 44 DEPAuL L. REV. 797 (1995) (recognizing that an empirical resolution is
impossible, but arguing that federal courts are superior due to institutional factors); Martin
H. Redish, JudicialParity,Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal
Jurisdictionand ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1988) (doubting that
anything original can be added to the parity debate, but maintaining the possibility of a
resolution on the basis of "well-established institutional factors").
23. See Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, JudicialReview in the New Nations
of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 559 (1993). The authors state:
The demise of the Soviet Empire has sparked a renaissance in comparative
social science and legal scholarship. . . . Western ideas regarding the
structure of the economy, the relationship between the various branches of
government, and the relationship of the state to the individual have come
under scrutiny in an attempt to transpose the experience the West has to
offer onto the traditions and institutions of the emerging nations.
Id. at 559. Obviously, lessons from comparative legal analysis can benefit mutually.
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for comparison because it has a similar judicial structure,' a legacy of
federalism,2' and over 1.2 million private property claims resulting from
unification with former East Germany.26 However, there is no German
parity debate because structural and motivational factors of its' judicial
system create sufficient confidence that German state courts are adequate
protectors of federal constitutional rights. 7
Part I of this article provides a review of the parity debate in the United
States. This section presents the historical background of the parity issue
and private property rights. In addition, Part I offers a comparison of the
different approaches to the parity debate and explains Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky's litigant choice principle. Part II examines parity in
Germany, first tracing the role of federalism in Germany, and second,
analyzing parity and the litigation of private property rights in German
courts. Part III offers two important lessons from the German model that
could be applied in the United States. This article then asserts the viability
of Chemerinsky's litigant choice principle in light of these lessons from the
German model. Although this article focuses on private property rights, the
litigant choice principle would apply to any rights protected by the federal
Constitution.
I. THE PARITY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE JUDICIARY ACT

The question of whether lower federal and state courts are fungible for
the purpose of protecting constitutionally protected liberties is not a recent
one.28 At the Constitutional Convention,29 it was not an accepted fact that
24. See Donald P. Kommers, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Comparative
Constitutionalism: German Constitutionalism:A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 840
(1991) (providing an overview of German constitutional law and the Federal Constitutional

Court).

25. Id.
26. See Dorothy Ames Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property
Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527, 527 n.3 (1991) (reviewing the Unification
Treaty and judicial approaches as means for resolving rival claims on former East German
property).
27. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (discussing parity in Germany).
28. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 239 (providing a history of the parity
question).
29. The Constitutional Convention convened in 1787 to replace the Articles of
Confederation (1777) which were viewed by most to be a failure. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
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the country even needed lower federal courts.3° On one side stood advocates such as John Rutledge, who asserted that "the State Tribunals might
and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance, the right of
appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the

national rights and uniformity of Judgments . ... ",3 In opposition to this,

James Madison contended, "Confidence cannot be put in the State Tribunals
as guardians of the national authority and interests."32 In addition,
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government [i.e., the federal government] will at all times
stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves
into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If
their rightsare invaded by either, they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in

them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an
advantage which can never be too highly prized!33
The Madisonian Compromise resulted, leaving to Congress the discretion to
create the lower federal courts. 4 The fact that the lower federal courts
were not given exclusive jurisdiction over federal questions indicates a lack
of concern with state court prejudice toward parties asserting federal claims
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 116 (2d ed. 1985).

30. See Martin Redish and Curtis Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdictionof Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA.
L. REv. 45, 52-55 (1975) (reviewing the conflict at the Constitutional Convention over the
creation of lower federal courts and the resulting Madisonian Compromise to give Congress

the option of creating lower federal courts).

31. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrrrToNAL CONVENTION
124 (1966).

32. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

27 (1966).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
34. Congressional power to create the lower federal courts is provided in the U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1 states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold Offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.
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in state forums 35 and manifests a faith in overall parity between Supreme
Court and state forums for litigating federal constitutional rights.
There were several challenges to the presumption of parity prior to the
Civil War. The two prominent challenges were the state court resistance to
the Bank of the United States, 36 and Northern state court resistance to
federal measures requiring the return of runaway slaves to their Southern
owners.
The challenges resulted in a recognized tension between states
and the federal government when either exercised sovereignty to the
disagreement of the other. Obviously, the most prolific manifestation of this
tension was the Civil War, which was less about whether slavery was right
or wrong, but more about who had the authority to make the determination.
Although the Union victory settled the issue of supremacy, it did not end the
parity debate. However, following the Civil War, the tension shifted
temporarily to one between Southern state and federal courts.
2. Post-Civil War to the End of the Nineteenth Century
After the Civil War, Congress was concerned that Southern state courts
would not protect the rights of the newly freed slaves.3
As a result,
Congress passed statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1871,'9 which
expanded federal court jurisdiction to parties claiming violations of federal
constitutional rights by state or municipal governments. 40 Similarly, habeas
corpus relief for state prisoners and general federal question jurisdiction
were products of distrust in the state court willingness to enforce federal
constitutional rights.41
The definition of who had constitutional rights changed when, in 1886,
the Supreme Court recognized corporations as "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 This expanded definition of "person" provided
35. See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 48 (1985).
36. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (holding
unconstitutional Ohio's tax on the Bank of the United States); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding unconstitutional Maryland's tax on the Bank of the
United States).
37. See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1976) (discussing the judicial

response to the slave laws); MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860
(1981) (discussing the categorization and codification of slave laws).
38. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 240-41.
39. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is now contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Id.
at 241.
40. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) cited
in Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 241.
41. Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 241.
42. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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corporations with a defense against state regulatory measures because of the
43
As a result,
increased content ascribed to the Due Process Clause.
Amendment
Fourteenth
their
of
enforcement
sought
business corporations
rights in federal courts under federal question jurisdiction granted in
1875," while state regulatory agencies sought state court forums for
litigating state regulatory claims.45 This is an early example of searching
for a sympathetic forum. Both corporations and state regulatory agencies
acted on beliefs about the state courts. Prior to 1875, state courts had
original jurisdiction over federal law.6 Thus, after 1875, the parity
question shifted from whether state courts are adequate guardians of
constitutional rights to whether state courts are functionally interchangeable
with lower federal courts in protecting constitutional rights. Obviously,
corporations and state regulatory agencies had different answers to this
question.
3. The Early Twentieth Century to the Warren Court
During the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
protected economic rights with the same level of judicial scrutiny given any
43. See Neuborne, supra note 19, at 1106-07; see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prevented Louisiana
from making it a misdemeanor to use the postal service to enter into a contract with a New
York insurance company, not licensed in Louisiana, to insure goods from Louisiana to
Europe).
44. The present form is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1982), which provides, "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States." Prior to 1875, federal question cases were limited to those
areas where a specific federal statute authorized federal court jurisdiction on particular issues.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 253.
45. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (rejecting the sufficiency of
Nebraska state court determinations of rates for a corporation maintaining a highway under
legislative sanction); see Neuborne, supra note 18, at 1107.
46. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
In the early days of our Republic, Congress was content to leave the task
of interpreting and applying federal laws in the first instance to state courts;
with one short-lived exception, Congress did not grant the inferior federal
courts original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law until 1875.
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
omitted). Justice Brennan went on to cite uniformity of decisions and
(footnote
Id.
specialization over federal law as the two motives for expanding the role of the inferior
federal courts. Id. at 826-27. With regard to the former, Brennan notes that "while perfect
uniformity may not have been achieved, experience indicates that the availability of afederal
forum in federal-question cases has done much to advance that goal." Id. at 826 (emphasis
added).
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constitutional right,47 producing opinions such as Lochner v. New York.4 8
Lochner4 9 invalidated a statute setting the maximum hours for bakers
because it violated the bakers' freedom of contract. 5° Justice Peckham,
writing for the majority, stated:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between the employer and employees, concerning the
number of hours in which the latter may labor in the
bakery of the employer. The general right to make a
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.51
With opinions such as Lochner,52 litigants claiming violations of property
rights had strong precedents to rely on in either state or federal forums.
However, this willingness to protect economic liberties was not to last.
The crucial shift came in the 1930s, when the Supreme Court devalued
economic liberties from a fundamental liberty53 in cases such as Nebbia v.
New York,54 and United States v. Carolene Products.55 This reclassifica-

47.
48.
49.
50.

See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 241.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id.
Id.

51. Id. at 50 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)) (emphasis added).
52. Id.

53. The concept of fundamental liberties has been steadily evolving as the Supreme
Court has incorporated the Bill of Rights, originally meant to limit federal action, into the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, therein applying the limitations to the states.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11.5-11.6 (4th ed.
1991) (discussing fundamental constitutional rights and the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights).
54. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In Nebbia, Nebbia was charged with selling milk too
cheaply, in violation of a New York statute which sought to ensure an adequate supply of
milk by imposing minimum and maximum prices. Id For the majority, Justice Roberts
stated that "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage in a
business or to conduct it as one pleases." Id. at 527-28. In dissent, Justice McReynolds
stated that the legislature "cannot lawfully destroy guaranteed rights of one man with the
prime purpose of enriching another, even if for the moment, this may seem advantageous to
the public." Id. at 558.
55. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court in Carolene Products upheld a federal statute
prohibiting the sale of filled milk in interstate commerce. Id. In declaring the statute valid,
the Court created a dual standard of review, finding a violation for economic regulation only
if such a statute did not rely "upon some rationalbasiswithin the knowledge and experience
of the legislators." Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
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tion brought an accompanying lowering of judicial scrutiny,-6 leading to

The
judicial abdication of review power in economic liberties cases.
federal courts withdrew themselves as guardians of economic liberties, thus
allowing federal and state legislatures much leeway to enact economic
regulation."8 Professor James Ely stated of Carolene Products:
Economic rights were implicitly assigned a secondary
constitutional status. Because the reasonableness of
economic regulations was presumed, judicial scrutiny of
legislation under the rational basis test became purely
nominal. Consequently, the Court gave great latitude to
Congress and state legislatures to fashion economic
policy, while expressing only perfunctory concern for the
rights of individual property owners. After 1937, as
demonstrated in Carolene Products,the justices routinely
accepted legislative statements of policy, no matter how
implausible, as a basis for upholding regulatory mea59
sures.

The Supreme Court's announcement of its abdication of judicial review

of economic regulations opened the door to legislation that would signifi-

cantly erode economic liberties. Those whose economic liberties were
violated were left adrift, having no guardians in the courts to protect them
This judicial approach to economic liberties was
from legislatures.'
complicated by subsequent shifts in the Supreme Court's view of parity.
4. The Warren Court to the Present
In general, the Warren Court 6 operated under the premise that the
56. Id.

57. See SIEGAN, supra note 15, at 189 (assessing the impact of CaroleneProductsand
arguing that the holding lacked any basis in the original intention of the Framers of the
Constitution).
58. Id. "The judicial abdication advanced in footnote 4 [of Carolene Products]
impedes democratic processes. In the absence of judicial review, legislators have great
power over the commercial community, effectively reducing freedom of political choice and
expression for its members." Id.
59. ELY, supra note 14, at 133 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 134.
61. See

WALLACE MENDELSON, SUPREME COURT STATECRAFT: THE RULE OP LAW

AND MEN 335 n.34 (1985). "The phenomenon called 'Warren Court activism' did not begin

in the complacent 1950's when Earl Warren became Chief Justice (1953). Rather, .... it was
part and parcel of the flaming 1960's.... The difference between the Warren Court of the
1950's and the Warren Court of the 1960's is stupendous." Id. Warren left the Court in
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federal courts were best suited to guard constitutional rights.62 This
prompted an expansion of federal jurisdiction. For example, federal habeas
corpus relief for state prisoners grew, causing an increase in the number of
claims to the federal court, which often relied on a lack of trustworthiness
of state courts to guard a defendant's constitutional rights.63 For example,
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen(' created an important exception to
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.65 One commentator observed that
Brown' established that "a state prisoner ought to have an opportunity for
a hearing on a federal constitutional claim in a federal constitutional court.
.. ,,67Thus, Brown communicates a definite mistrust of the state courts
and a lack of parity. However, the approach to parity took a significant
reversal with the advent of the Burger Court."
The Burger Court adopted a markedly different approach to the
vigilance of state court protection of federal constitutional rights.69 In
Stone v. Powell,70 the Supreme Court partially overturned Brown v.
Allen7 by holding that state defendants should not be allowed to relitigate
on the basis of a contention that evidence admitted at trial was gained by an
unconstitutional search and seizure.72 In doing so, the Burger Court
rejected the argument that state judges are inadequate protectors of federal
constitutional rights.73

1969. 1d. at 336.

62. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 242-47.

63. Id. at 244.
64. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (allowing relitigation of federal constitutional claims on
habeas corpus).
65. Id. The collateral estoppel doctrine states that "Prior judgment between [the] same
parties on [a] different cause of action is an estoppel as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, on determination of which finding or verdict was rendered. When an issue of
ultimate fact has been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot be again litigated
between the same parties in future litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed.
1990).
66. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
67. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Forward: The Time Chart of

the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106 (1959).
68. The Burger Court, so named when Chief Justice Burger led the Court, extended
from 1969 through 1986.
69. See Hart, supra note 67, at 107-08.
70. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
71. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
72. 428 U.S. at 494.
73. Id. at 489-94. See Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939
(1991) (discussing the shift in approach to the habeas review taken by the Burger and
Rehnquist courts).
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Recent land use decisions by the Rehnquist Court 4 renew the issue
of enforcement of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause in the parity
debate. 5 In the latest example, Dolan v. City of Tigard,6 although the
Oregon state courts found no taking, the United States Supreme Court
expressed a renewed willingness to protect private property rights,
prohibiting exactions unless they are roughly proportional "both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 7 Thus, litigants
with Dolan-type actions have an additional source of law to consider. s
Although Dolan creates additional federal protection of private property
rights, it by no means overturns the prior fifty years of state and federal
regulation of economic liberties which developed in the environment of
post-Lochner79 judicial deference. Even if a future Supreme Court restores
economic liberties to the status of a fundamental liberty, there will be an
ongoing need to address the question of whether state courts are as willing
and able to protect federal constitutional rights as the lower federal courts.
B. THE PARITY DEBATE AT STALEMATE

The parity debate is divided simply by the response to a simple
question: Are the state courts functionally interchangeable with the lower
federal courts in their likelihood to protect federal constitutional rights?80

74. The Rehnquist Court began in 1986 and continues to the present.
75. See Neuborne, supra note 22, at 799 n.12 (observing that the takings area is one
where the current federal courts appear willing to defend individual rights). For an overview
of federal takings jurisprudence, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). Again, this article uses the area of federal
constitutional takings primarily as a vehicle for discussing parity.
76. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that the state's denial of all economic benefit or productive use
to the land owner amounts to a taking); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825 (1987) (holding that there must be a reasonable, essential nexus between a building
permit condition and the legislative restriction on the land use).
77. 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. The Court stated, "The city's goal of reducing flooding
hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, but there
are outer limits to how this may be done." Id. at 2322.
78. Although this article discusses federal constitutional takings, most states have a
highly developed body of state constitutional takings law of their own. See Timothy L.
Gartin, Comment, Taking Lessons: The Supreme Court Raises the Federal Constitutional
Takings Floor Closer to the State Ceiling (Nov. 21, 1995) (on file with author) (contending
that the recent trend of the United States Supreme Court towards a greater protection of
private property rights is a re-adjustment of the floor of federal protection in response to the
upward momentum of state constitutional ceilings).
79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
80. See Neuborne, supra note 19.
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Aside from Professor Chemerinsky, the scholarly debate has produced three

answers: yes, no, and the answer is unimportant."s The question is deceptively simple and the approaches in answering are straight forward, but the
implications are profound for the way parties litigate constitutional rights.
1. Side One: Parity Does Not Exist
On one side of the debate are those who believe that federal courts are
more willing to enforce constitutional rights in litigation between the state
or federal government and private citizens.8 2 Again, this was the approach
of the Warren Court."a The means for attacking the existence of parity
vary. 4 One approach15 posits that state courts are disadvantaged because
they lack Article III provisions for political insulation of life tenure on good
behavior and an irreducible salary. 6 Others believe that structure aside,
federal judges are intellectually superior and more committed to protecting
federal rights than are state judges.8 7

81. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 34-36 (reviewing the literature in the parity
debate).
82. See, e.g., Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles
of State and FederalCourts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 1 (1986); Gary
Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579
(1982); Neuborne, supra note 19; Burt Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParityin Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981); Donald H. Ziegler, Federal Court Reform
of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrinefrom a Modern
Perspective, 19 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 31 (1985).
83. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (describing the Warren Court's
approach to parity).
84. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, §1.5, at 34.
85. See, e.g., Neubome, supra note 19.
86. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Thirty-eight states have some form of judicial election.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 34.
87. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 35. Posner asserts that "it is widely believed that
federal judges are, on average (an important qualifier) of higher quality than their state
counterparts." Id. at 144. However, Posner does say that whether federal courts are superior
to state courts is not for him to say. Id. See also Neubome, supra note 19, at 1121-25;
Martin H. Redish, JudicialParity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on
FederalJurisdictionand ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988).
Scholars such as Professor Thomas Marvell have attempted to prove this by
empirical studies. Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationalesfor Federal Question Jurisdiction:An
Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315 (1984)
(analyzing the reasons why lawyers selected federal courts for student rights litigation).
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2. Side Two: Defense of Parity's Existence
State courts have had adamant defenders of their willingness and
competence to enforce constitutional rights."8 Such advocates maintain that
federal jurisdiction should be constricted, as it was during the Burger
Court. 9 In defense of parity's existence, Professors Michael Solimine and
James Walker used empirical studies to rebut empirical evidence asserting
state hostility to federal constitutional claims. 9° However, no scholars have
been able to offer either irrefutable arguments or empirical evidence to
support the theory that parity exists or does not exist.
3. Side Three: The Parity Debate's Outcome is Unimportant
Some commentators discount the importance of deciding conclusively
whether parity exists, the issue of importance being the provision of a full
and fair hearing.9 Thus, differing results between state and federal courts
on the same matter is of less significance than a fair hearing.92 However,
litigants whose federal constitutional rights remain unprotected would likely
have a very different opinion.
The satisfaction of the provision of a "full and fair hearing" is impotent
if, as a result, the federal constitutional rights of the litigant remain
unprotected. Making a generalization about the existence of parity is
complicated because: (1) historically, courts have shifted in their willingness
to protect federal constitutional rights; 93 (2) federal and state courts are
inclined to defer to their respective legislature in matters of economic

88. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.

& MARY

L. REV. 605 (1981) (rebutting the claims of those opposing parity's existence);

Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983)

(contending that empirical data demonstrates the equivalence of state courts to defend
constitutional rights).
89. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (describing the Burger Court's
approach to parity).
90. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 88.

91. See Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State

Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing that what is of crucial importance is not
the result, but whether there was a full and fair hearing).

92. Id.

93. See supra notes 28-79 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background
of the parity problem in the United States).
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liberties;" and (3) the ability of state judges varies. 95 This array of
factors illustrates the pragmatic difficulty of resolving the parity debate.
4. The Parity Stalemate
How one answers the parity question has crucial implications for the
litigation of federal constitutional rights. As explained above, there is
nothing fair about a hearing that offers all the formalities of a "fair" hearing
but does not protect federal constitutional rights." The task of attaining
fairness is further complicated when state courts must occasionally review
federal legislation, and conversely, when federal courts must review state
legislation. The nightmare, of course, is our present judicial environment
where, until recently, neither forum has guarded economic liberties in
general, nor private property rights in particular.97
Those who argue for and against the existence of parity between state
and lower federal courts do so under the premise that an answer can be
determined conclusively.9" However, "parity is an empirical question-whether one court system is as good as another--for which there never can
be any meaningful empirical measure." 9 Thus, generalizations are of little
value because of the inability to make meaningful comparisons.
The reason why the parity debate is at a stalemate is because it has thus
far asked the right question but tried to answer it with a generalization. The
question of state court adequacy must still be answered, but it must be
answered on a case-by-case basis because the answer will necessarily vary
by jurisdiction, by court, and by issue. When limited to a particular case,
a more definite answer can be made. The question then to be addressed is,
"Who should determine which forum is most likely to protect an allegedly

94. See supra notes 28-79 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background
of the parity problem in the United States).
95. See POSNER, supra note 35 and accompanying text (presenting the belief that
federal judges are superior in quality to state judges).
96. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (discussing the side that the parity
debate's outcome is unimportant).
97. See supra notes 28-79 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background
of the parity problem). Again, many states have a higher ceiling of protection from takings
than the federal floor. See Peter J. Galie, State Courts and Economic Rights, 496 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. March 1988, at 76, 81.
98. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (discussing the positions for and
against the existence of parity).
99. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 236. See also Neuborne, supra note 22, at 798
(arguing that "it has been impossible to resolve the [parity] dispute empirically, principally
because no agreement exists about what we mean as 'better'').
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violated constitutional right?" Professor Chemerinsky contends it is the
litigant who claims the violation of a federal constitutional right.
C. PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY'S LITIGANT CHOICE PRINCIPLE

Professor Chemerinsky proposes that litigants with federal constitutional
claims should have the choice of either a federal or state forum in which to
litigate conflicts."° This approach nullifies the parity debate by leaving
the choice of the forum to the litigant's determination of which court would
best protect the particular constitutional claim.'' Such a system of rules
would maximize the protection of constitutional rights, a goal consistent
with the commitment to protect individual liberties." ° This approach
would also advance federalism's goal of protecting constitutional rights by
encouraging competition between federal and state governments for the
reputation as the best guardian of constitutional rights. 3
Chemerinsky's litigant choice principle"°' varies in its application to
civil and criminal cases. 5 In civil cases, either the plaintiff or the
defendant raising a constitutional claim would be able to choose whether to
litigate the claim in state or federal court."° This would mean several
100. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 236-37.
101. Id. at 302.
102. Id. at 303-04. Chemerinsky states:
[I]t makes sense to design court systems and jurisdictional rules so as to
maximize the opportunity for protecting constitutional rights. Logically,
the court system must strive toward one of the three following goals:
maximization of the opportunity for the. protection of rights, minimization
of the opportunity for the protection of rights, or neutrality as to the
opportunities for protecting rights.
The first, maximizing the opportunitiesfor the protection of rights, is most
consistent with this country's commitment to individual liberties and
upholding the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 308-09. Professor Chemerinsky cites Professor Amar's view that the goal
of federalism is the maximization of individual liberties. Amar states:
[A] healthy competition among limited governments for the hearts of the
American People can protect popular sovereignty and spur a race to the
high ground of constitutional remedies. Each government can act as a
remedial cavalry of sorts, eager to win public honor by riding to the rescue
of citizens victimized by another government's misconduct.
Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1428 (1987).
104. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 300-26 (presenting Chemerinsky's argument
for the litigant choice principle).
105. Id. at 312-21 (applying the litigant choice principle to civil litigation, then to
criminal cases).
106. Id. at 312.
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changes to the current manner of forum determination. Presently, federal
jurisdiction is determined, in part, by the following principles (assuming no
independent basis of federal court jurisdiction): (1) federal questions are
litigated in federal court only if present on the face of the plaintiff's wellpleaded complaint; ° (2) a defendant can only remove a case from a state
to a federal court if the claim could have originally been brought in federal
court;'08 and (3) a defendant cannot remove from federal to state
court. 19

Applying the litigant choice principle would require several changes.
First, federal court jurisdiction could be based on constitutional claims raised
in a defense." 0 Second, if the plaintiff has a constitutional claim and the
defendant does not, the plaintiff should be able to bring the claim in state
court without the defendant being able to remove it to federal court."' In
the situation where two private parties assert constitutional claims, the current jurisdictional rules would apply, providing either party the option of
bringing or removing to federal court respectively.1 2 Third, where a
plaintiff files in federal court but has no constitutional claim, a defendant
with a constitutional claim should be able to remove from federal to state
court." 3 The litigant choice principle does not rely on any premises of
superiority of either forum, but instead, leaves it to the party with the
constitutional claim to determine which court will be most sympathetic to
the particular claim." 4
The litigant choice principle would also have a significant effect in the
context of criminal cases. Presently, a criminal defendant is not permitted
to select the forum." 5 Professor Chemerinsky does not advocate a full
implementation of the litigant choice principle in criminal cases," 6 but
rather offers two possible modifications." 7

107. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (holding that a
constitutional issue arising as an anticipated defense does not entitle a defendant to a federal
forum).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (specifying rules for removal of cases from state to
federal court).
109. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 314-15.
110. Id. at 313.
111. Id. at 315.
112. Id. at 313.
113. Id. at 315.
114. Id. at 300-26.
115. Id. at 316.
116. Id. at 316-17.
117. Id. at 319-20.
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A pure application of the litigant choice principle to criminal cases
would allow a defendant with a federal constitutional claim in state court to
remove to federal court,"' or from federal court to state court.11 9 Professor Chemerinsky concedes that removal in criminal cases would be a
radical change."2 However, he maintains that "[s]uch litigation would fit
within the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III because
long ago the Supreme Court declared that cases arise under federal law if
a question of federal law is likely to be determinative of the outcome in the
litigation." ''
Chemerinsky then offers two alternatives. In the first, a defendant with
a constitutional claim would be allowed to interrupt the litigation and
present the other forum with the constitutional question."
The second
alternative would permit relitigation of a constitutional claim on a de novo
basis in the forum of the defendant's choosing after the initial litigation.1"
Thus, with regard to habeas review, Chemerinsky's alternatives should
appeal to advocates of both the Warren Court's and the Burger-Rehnquist
Court's approaches to habeas review: the former because the criminal defendant will have a right to federal court review of an alleged constitutional
right; the latter because, if the first alternative is applied, only the constitutional issue would be heard by the other forum.
In order for the legal system in the United States to adopt the litigant
choice principle, substantial political and scholastic momentum must be
generated. Such momentum is certainly aided by a demonstration of the
principle's use in a country with a similar legal system. Although there is
no country with precisely our legal system that purely applies the litigant
choice principle, there is a legal system that has common denominators with
Chemerinsky's proposal. Germany's legal system lends itself to such a
comparison. Germany provides evidence for consideration in the parity
debate in the United States to the degree it has a similar legal system, and,
to the degree it applies aspects of the litigant choice principle, albeit without
Chemerinsky in mind.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122. Id. at 319.
123. Id. at 319-20. A de novo trial means "[t]rying a matter anew; the same as if it had
not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).

PARITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

II. PARITY IN GERMANY

Germany is an appropriate country for comparison because its political
and legal systems share many important characteristics with those of the
United States. Although Germany is a civil law country,"24 its judiciary
branch has a more prominent role than most civil law countries, which
generally rely heavily or exclusively on their legislative branches for the
creation of laws and policies." s Because the parity debate is a focused
sub-issue of judicial federalism, the role of federalism in Germany is described first. Following this, a basic overview of the German legal system
will be given. Only the fundamentals of the German system are required to
answer the question of whether German state courts are adequate guardians
of constitutional rights in general and then specifically with regard to private
property rights. Analysis of the German approach yields two important
lessons that support the application of the litigant choice principle in the
United States.
A. FEDERALISM IN GERMANY

Germany has enjoyed a long tradition of federalism, which continues
to the present."z When the Holy Roman Empire collapsed, a loose
association of "some 300 independent and mutually suspicious states,
principalities and free cities" remained in what is now Germany.' 27
German unification did not occur until 1871, with Prince Otto von
Bismarck"2 and the rise of Prussia and a strong federal union.' 29 The
Weimar Republic,' 3° which followed, was a weak version of federalism

124. Civil law countries are those which have a codified legal system. See Utter &
Lundsgaard, supra note 23, at 563 (considering the exercise of judicial review in countries
with civil law and socialist legal systems that may be unprepared to adopt it). This would
include all of the western continental European countries. Id.
125. Id.
126. See generally Ulrich Karpen, Federalism, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW

WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 205, 207 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988) (discussing
the model of German federalism, how federalism affects government policy decisions, and
problems facing contemporary German federalism).
127. Id.
128. Peter Lerche, Principlesof German Federalism,in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 71-72 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
129. See Karpen, supra note 126, at 208.
130. The Weimar Republic existed from 1919 through 1933. See Karpen, supra note
126, at 208.
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resulting when the dynasty was replaced by a federal structure.131 The
32
Weimar Republic subsequently collapsed when Hitler came to power.1
33
After 1945, political life resumed in the eleven West German states
supported by the Allied Powers, who sought to decentralize West German
power and encourage local responsibility."3 Federalism did not exist in
East Germany 135 while it was ruled by the communist, centralized government. 1 6 However, with the unification of Germany in 1991,1'3 the
former East Germans have seen their political structure decentralize almost
overnight. Thus, with the recent exception of communist East Germany,
federalism is a historically well-established principle in German political
thought.
There are three motives behind federalism in modern Germany, which
largely parallel federalism in the United States. 3 Initially, federalism
regulates the centrifugal powers 3 created by the geographic differences
between the Bavarian southern uplands and the Prussian northern plains.t'°
However, federalism also reduces the centripetal powers' 4 ' created by big
bureaucracies. 4 2 Finally, federalism constitutes a part of the system of
checks and balances that exists horizontally, between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government, and vertically, between
43
local, state, and federal governments.
When examining parity in light of modern German federalism, there are
clear implications for the importance of having both the German Federal

131. Id.
132. Id. The National Socialist regime eliminated state sovereignty, centralizing all
power. See Lerche, supra note 128, at 72.
133. See Karpen, supra note 126, at 208. The German word for "states" is ".Lnder."
Id.
134. Id.
135. Formerly the German Democratic Republic.
136. See Karpen, supra note 126, at 208.
137. The German reunification treaty is entitled, "Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik iber die Herstellung der Einheit
Deutschlands: Einigungsvertrag" and was approved Sept. 23, 1990. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 31 n. 174 (1994).
138. See Arthur B. Gunlicks, Principlesof American Federalism, in GERMANY AND ITS
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 91 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds.,
1993) (comparing federalism in the United States and Germany).
139. Centrifugal political momentum is the tendency to resist centralization of power.
140. See Karpen, supra note 126, at 206.
141. Centripetal political momentum is the tendency toward centralization of power.
142. See Karpen, supra note 126, at 207.
143. Id.
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Constitutional Court'" and state courts 4 s protect constitutionally secured
rights. Allowing state courts to weigh constitutional questions provides a
check against infringements on rights by the federal government (i.e.,
thereby reducing centripetal powers), while access to the Federal Constitutional Court checks state infringement of constitutional rights (i.e., thereby
reducing centrifugal powers). The final aspect of the three aspects of
federalism discussed--the horizontal and vertical checks between branches
of government--has judicial applications as courts serve as guardians of
constitutional rights. However, a court's willingness to exercise judicial
review over the actions of the legislative and executive branches is
expressed by the level of scrutiny they apply in review. As will be
discussed later, the availability of state and federal forums deters unconstitutional deference to legislative branches.'"
B. AN OVERVIEW OF GERMANY'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM

An understanding of parity in Germany requires a survey of the
47 the Federal Constitutional Court, 48
fundamentals of the Basic Law,
and the federal 49 and state courts.) ° In civil law countries, judges have
traditionally played a very limited role because of the prevalence of legal
a heavy reliance on legislative supremacy, 5 2 and the
positivism,'
absence of a doctrine of precedent. 5 3 As a result, the concept of judicial
144. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing the German Federal
Constitutional Court).
145. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing the German state
courts).
146. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (analyzing parity in Germany).
147. See infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Basic Law).
148. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Constitutional Court).
149. See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (discussing the German federal
courts).
150. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing the German state
courts).
151. See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 23, at 563 (discussing the limited role of the
civil law judge). Legal positivism is the view that laws are established by human authority
based solely on observation and analysis; it repudiates natural law theory and reliance on
metaphysical bases for the law. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 19 (rev. ed. 1990).
152. See Utter & Lundsgaard, supranote 23, at 563. Reliance on legislative supremacy,
the "purest expression of the collective will," is the result of European rejection of
monarchical feudalism. Id. at 563-64. The legislative bodies are thus trusted to restrain
themselves from becoming oppressive. Id. at 564.
153. Id. at 563. Civil law countries do not employ the doctrine of stare decisis; rather
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review is generally far removed1 4 The civil law judiciary's primary role,
then, is to determine facts in a case and to strictly apply the legislative policies.'"5
Germany's judiciary fit the mold of the courts in civil law countries
until the Second World War.'5 During World War II, "[t]he Nazi and
fascist experiences in particular dealt crushing blows to the continental faith
in the superiority of the legislature in protecting civil and political liberties."" 7 This faith in the legislature was replaced by an increased hope
that protection of individual rights would come from the judiciary.'
Thus, judicial review in Germany was born out of the lesson of going
without such a check on the legislature to protect basic individual rights.
A second check on the legislature which resulted from World War II was
the Basic Law.

1. The Basic Law
West Germany adopted the Basic Law" 9 on May 23, 1949 as a
temporary document awaiting national unification 60 However, when the
Unification Treaty was signed between East and West Germany over forty
years later,' 6' rather than write a new constitution, the Basic Law gained
permanence as the law of unified Germany. 6 2 The Basic Law contains
146 articles divided into fourteen sections. 63 Freedoms considered fundamental are catalogued in Section I, which includes an article for guarding
they limit their judges by using comprehensive legal codes. Id.
154. Id. at 564.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 570.
157. Id.

158. Id. The Federal Constitutional Court was equipped with judicial review authority

to protect the human rights as explicitly listed by the German Constitution created following
World War IL Id.
159. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, translatedin CURRIE,
supra note 137, at 343-412.
160. See Kommers, supra note 24, at 837.

161. See Jeffress, supra note 26, at 528 n.6.

162. See Kommers, supra note 24, at 837.
163. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, translated in CURRIE,
supra note 137, at 343-412. The sections are. as follows: § I. Basic Rights, § II. The
Federation and the States (I.Ander), § III. The Federal Parliament, § IV The Council of States
(Bundesrat), § IVa. The Joint Committee, § V. The Federal President, § VI. The Federal

Government (Bundesregierung), § VII. Legislative Powers of the Federation (Bund), § VIII.

The Execution of Federal Statutes and the Federal Administration, § VIIIa. Joint Tasks, § IX.

The Administration of Justice, § X. Finance, § Xa. State of Defense, § XI. Transitional and
Concluding Provisions, and Appendix. Id.
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The administration of justice is provided in Section
property rights.'
6
judiciary is independent and divided into three court
The
German
IX.
systems: the Federal Constitutional Court,'" the federal courts, 67 and
the courts of the Lander. 6 In addition to civil and penal law courts, there
See
and finance courts.172
social,'
are administrative,"6 labor,"
73
Diagram A on the following page.

164. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, Art. 14, translated in
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 349. Article 14 states:

(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content
and limits shall be determined by statute.
(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
(3) The taking of property is permissible only for the public weal. It may
be effected only by or pursuant to a statute regulating the nature and extent
of compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing
an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation,
recourse may be had to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction.
Id. Therefore, Professor Currie observes, "property rights are by no means relegated to an
inferior position in Germany, as they have been in the United States. Economic independence is understood to be essential to every other freedom, and property rights are taken very
seriously." CURRIE, supra note 137, at 290 (footnotes omitted). In addition, takings are not
justified simply because just compensation is paid; rather, Article 14 guarantees property
itself. It. at 291.
165. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, § IX, translated in
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 383-88. The twelve articles which compose § IX are as follows:
Article 92 Court organization; Article 93 Federal Constitutional Court: jurisdiction; Article
94 Federal Constitutional Court: composition; Article 95 Highest Courts of the Federation:
Joint Panel; Article 96 Other federal courts, exercise of federal jurisdiction by courts of the
Under; Article 97 Independence of the judges; Article 98 Legal status of judges in the
Federation and the Under; Article 99 Decision by the Federal Constitutional Court and the
highest courts of the Federation in disputes concerning Land law; Article 100 Compatibility
of statutory law with the Basic Law; Article 101 Ban on extraordinary courts; Article 102
Abolition of capital punishment; Article 103 Hearing in accordance with law, ban on
retroactive criminal legislation and on repeated punishment; Article 104 Legal guarantees in
the event of deprivation of liberty. Id.
166. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 92, translated in
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 383.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 95, § 1, translated in
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 385.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Helmuth Aldinger, The Legal System of the Federal Republic of Germany, in
MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.3(C) (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1994).
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2. The Federal Constitutional Court
The justices who serve on the Federal Constitutional Court are elected
in equal proportion by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat legislative75
bodies. 74 Independence of all judges, grounded in the Basic Law,
does not differ substantially with the independence of Article III courts in
the United States. 176 The jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court
is explicitly provided for in a catalog in the Basic Law. 177 Of particular
78
interest to this article are Basic Law protections of private property
which provide that anyone who claims that one of his constitutional property
rights have been violated may file a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. 179 The Federal Constitutional Court has a monopoly of the
jurisdiction over constitutional questions." ° Thus, while federal and state
courts in the United States may exercise judicial review on the grounds of

174. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 94, § 1, translatedin
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 384-85. The selection of the German federal legislative bodies
is similar to the process in the United States. See Aldinger supra note 173, § 1.2(H). The
Bundestag is comparable to the U.S. House of Representatives with the number of
representatives partially based on population. Id. The Bundesrat is parallel to the U.S.
Senate, with each German state sending two representatives. Id.
175. See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Basic Law).
176. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 97, translated in
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 386. Article 97 provides:
(1) The judges shall be independent and subject only to the law.
(2) Judges appointed permanently on a full-time basis in established
positions cannot, against their will, be dismissed or permanently or
temporarily suspended from office or given a different position or retired
before the expiration of their term of office except by virtue of judicial
decision and only on the grounds and in the manner provided by statute.
Legislation may set age limits for the retirement of judges appointed for
life. In the event of changes in the structure of courts or in their districts,
judges may be transferred to another court or removed from office,
provided they retain their full salary.
Id.; see infra notes 204-09 (discussing the political insulation of German judges).
177. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 93, translated in

CURRIE, supra note 137, at 384.
178. See supra note 164 (quoting art. 14, the Basic Law's protection for property).
179. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 93 § 1(4a), translated
in CURRIE, supra note 137, at 384.
180. See PHILIP M. BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEW IN WEST GERMANY 27
(1981).
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unconstitutionality,'' lower German courts must obtain a Federal Constitutional Court ruling to do the same.'82
The allowance of direct appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court
would appear to create an unmanageable workload for the court; however,
what one commentator calls a "fine judicial sieve" is used to process the
constitutional complaints.' 83 The screening process involves two parts,
incorporating statutory provisions for dismissal of constitutional complaints
and judge-made requirements for admissibility, comparable to standing
requirements.'"
3. The Federal Courts
German federal courts are divided into the Federal Supreme Court and
the five special courts which cover patent, administrative, tax, labor, and
social insurance law.' 85 There is no dual judicial hierarchy between the
state and federal courts as there is in the United States."M The Federal
Supreme Court is the highest court for matters outside the jurisdiction of the
special courts. 87 In terms of the judiciary in the United States, Germany
has state district, appellate, and supreme courts, and then only a Federal
Supreme Court. Germany does not have lower federal courts except in
patent law, which is exclusively under federal jurisdiction.'
The German judicial structure mirrors the legislative authority granted
by the Basic Law. The distinction between federal and state law is not
significant in the German legal system. 89 The Basic Law clearly delin181. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 62 (2d ed. 1962) (explaining the history and
iheory behind judicial review).
182. See BLAIR, supra note 180, at 27.

183. See Michael Singer, The ConstitutionalCourt of the German Federal Republic:
Jurisdiction over Individual Complaints, 31 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 331 (1982) (examining the
means the Federal Constitutional Court uses to process claims when it makes access to the
Court so open). The rejection rate of all complaints is quite high: somewhat more than the
ninety-eight percent of the 2500 to 3000 complaints brought before the Federal Constitutional
Court annually. See Aldinger, supra note 173, at 3.110.24.
184. See Singer, supra note 183, at 333.
185. See Aldinger, supranote 173, § l.3(C)(3)(d)-(C)(4) (discussing the divisions within
the German judiciary).
186. Id. § 1.3(C)(1).
187. Id. § 1.3(C)(3)(d).
188. Id. § 1.3(C)(4)(a).
189. Id. § 1.3(A)(1). Aldinger notes: "Hypothetically, a conflict might arise where the
Basic Law gives the Federation concurrent legislation as to a certain subject. Then, absent
federal legislation, the States might for their respective territory regulate on this subject. But
once the Federation has exercised its right to legislate, Federal law overrides State law." Id.
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eates legislative power that the federal government holds exclusively 19
and that which it shares concurrently with the states,' 9' the concurrent
power being substantially greater in scope than the exclusive."9
4. The State Courts
The German state courts are divided between local courts,' 93 district
courts,194 and state supreme courts.' 95 Unless expressly assigned by
statute, the district court is the general court of first instance for civil and
criminal cases.'" It also hears appeals from the local courts. 97 The
state supreme court hears appeals from the district courts; however, it is the
court of last resort for cases originating in the local courts. 9
In light of the fact that there are no lower federal courts in Germany,
the state courts must rule on both state and federal law. 99 Although
federal law prevails over state law,2" the potential for conflict exists.2"'
Article 28 of the Basic Law acts as one guideline when it declares: "The
constitutional order in the Lander shall conform to the principles of republican, democratic and social government based on the rule of law, within the
meaning of the Basic Law. ', 202 Thus, states have a minimum standard
they must meet in their political actions. On the other side, the Federal
Constitutional Court has confirmed that the states have sovereign power
derived from their own existence rather than derived from the federation.20 3 As a result, German state courts, like state courts in the United
190. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 71, 73, translatedin
CURRIE, supra note 137, at 369. "The Lander shall have the right to legislate insofar as this
Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation." Id. at art. 70 § 1.

191.

BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 72, 74, translatedin

CURRIE, supra note 137, at 369-70.
192. Id.
193. See Aldinger, supra note 173, § 1.3(C)(3)(a).
194. Id. § 1.3(C)(3)(b).
195. Id. § 1.3(C)(3)(c). State supreme courts are regional courts of appeal. Id.
196. Id. § 1.3(C)(3)(b).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 1.3(C)(3)(c).
199. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of dual judicial
hierarchy between German state and federal courts).
200. See Aldinger, supra note 173, § 1.3(A)(1) (discussing the relationship between
state and federal laws).
201. Id.
202. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 28, § 1, translatedin

CURRIE, supra note 137, at 354.
203. 8 BVerfGE (1958), translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 89 (1989). The Court stated:
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States, are required to protect constitutional rights and simultaneously navigate between federal and state power.
One of the most important attributes of the German judiciary is the
political insulation for state and federal judges." The career path for a
German judge begins with a .test after law school." 5 Based on this test
and the number of available positions, judges are appointed by the Ministry
of Justice to a probationary five-year judgeship in a local court.
Upon
completing this, the judge is appointed as a judge for life, unless judicially
removed from office.2"7 The judge is then moved up at periodic intervals,
eventually becoming a federal judge." s To put things in terms of the judiciary in the United States, it would be as if state judges had all the political
insulation of Article III federal judges. 209 Thus, although there are
significant differences in the structure and composition of the German
judiciary from that of the United States, there is sufficient ground which
justifies an examination of the parity in the German judiciary.
C. PARITY OF GERMANY'S COURTS

Again, in the United States, the parity debate is whether state courts are
functionally interchangeable for lower federal courts in the protection of
federal constitutional rights.2 10 When examining the German judicial
system, this definition must be modified because Germany has no lower
federal courts. 2" Professor Currie notes:

As members of the federation, the LAnder are states vested with their own
sovereign powers--even though limited as to subject matter--derived not
from but rather recognized by the federation (Bund). .

Id.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
have life
210.
211.

.

. The Basic Law

requires only a certain degree of identity between federal and state
constitutions. To the extent that the Basic Law [does not provide
otherwise] the states are free to construct their own constitutional orders.
Their discretion [in this respect] most certainly extends to determining
whether the legislature should reserve to itself the passage of a law or
provide for [its approval] in popular referendum.
See Aldinger, supra note 173, § 1.3(C)(6)(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Constitution provides that Article III judges
tenure upon good behavior. Id.
See Neuborne, supra note 19 (defining parity).
See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (discussing German federal courts).
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German observers do not appear to view the absence
of lower federal courts as a threat to the supremacy of
federal law. Notwithstanding the force of John Marshall's
argument that appeal was an "insecure remedy" for
possible state hostility to federal rights, it should be borne
in mind that we got along under a somewhat similar
system until 1875.2"2
Thus the question for evaluating parity in the German judiciary is whether
the state courts are functionally interehangeable with the Federal Constitutional Court for protecting constitutional rights. Several factors
contribute to an affirmative answer to that question.
First, German federalism has definite implications for their judiciary.
The fact that the state local and district courts are generally the courts of
original jurisdiction, the Germans having seen insufficient need to create
lower federal courts, communicates a reliance on the state courts. Thus, the
lack of change in the judiciary structure implies a satisfaction with the
decentralized judiciary. Other factors explain more explicitly why the
German state courts are viewed as satisfactory guardians of constitutional
rights.
Second, the German judiciary is an independent branch of government
equipped with judicial review, a unique situation for a civil law country.213
Although in theory only the Federal Constitutional Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over constitutional questions,2" 4 pragmatically, state courts also
play a significant role in protecting constitutional rights from government
infringement because the state courts handle the bulk of the litigation.
Third, German state courts do have the possibility of federal court
review as well as review by the Federal Constitutional Court. Because the
decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (and the other federal courts)
overrule the decision of the state courts, the availability of access to the
Federal Constitutional Court directly, and to the federal courts by appeal,
provides an incentive to not be seen as being out of step with the federal
courts.2 5 This is especially true considering that state court judges
advance professionally based on decisions by the Ministry of Justice.21 6

212. CURRIE, supra note 137, at 76 (footnotes omitted).
213. See supra notes 147-58 (discussing the uniqueness of Germany as a civil law
country).
214. See BLAIR, supra note 180.
215. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 93, § l(4a), translated
in CURRIE, supra note 137, at 384.
216. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
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An unfavorable reputation with the federal judiciary would possibly hamper
advancement. For example, if a state judge developed a reputation of
consistently challenging the decisions made by the Federal Constitutional
Court, he might very well be jeopardizing his career. If a criticism is likely,
it is not that state court judges would be unsympathetic to constitutional
claims; rather, it would be that state court judges might be overly disposed
to deciding cases in a manner that would encourage advancement up the
judicial ladder.
Finally, for those scholars who believe the lack of political insulation
hinders state judges in the United States from acting objectively with regard
to state or local statutes infringing constitutional rights, German state judge
political insulation should allay these concerns about the German judiciary.2" 7 Thus, because German state judges are not considering the next
election when deciding a case, they are more likely to act objectively when
considering a constitutional claim. As a result, structural and motivational
factors combine to create the view that there is parity in Germany. This
parity is demonstrated in the German handling of private property issues.
D. THE LITIGATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GERMANY

With German unification came the problem of resolving 1.2 million
claims for the return of, or compensation for, former East German property
while concurrently reinstating private property rights.1 8 The problem is
complicated by conflicting claims for property in the former East Germany
between West and East Germans, and between claims from the early
postwar years and present claims. 2 9 The Unification Treaty 2 ° included
an agreement to return property in East Germany to its former owners
wherever possible.22' Where property cannot be returned to Germans who
fled to West Germany, either because it is now occupied by new residents
or it has been converted to public use, the government is supposed to
compensate the former owners. 222 However, the determination of which

becoming and advancing as a judge).
217. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
becoming and advancing as a judge).
218. See Jeffress, supra note 26, at 527 (reviewing the Unification Treaty and judicial
means for resolving rival claims on East German property).
219. Id.
220. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the Unification Treaty).
221. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the Unification Treaty).
222. See Jeffress, supra note 26, at 528 n.7 (reviewing the Unification Treaty and
judicial means for resolving rival claims on East German property).
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claims are valid and how to assess the just amounts for compensation has
been left to local tribunals. 22
Although the Unification Treaty attempted to deal with anticipated
conflicts, there are unresolved property issues. One of the interesting
questions is whether constitutional protections of property apply to
expropriations, made by the East German government, and then, if they
should apply, how. 22 Providing a role for local tribunals in former East
Germany alleviated East Germans' fear that their property interests would
go without protection. 2" At the time of the writing of this article, it is
unclear whether constitutional claims remain outstanding. However, what
is significant is that local courts have been given the role "to determine
which ownership claims are legitimate, which properties should remain
undisturbed, which can be returned to rightful owners, and how to assess
property values in cases awarding compensation." 226 The Unification
Treaty communicates a confidence in German state courts that exemplifies
a willingness to protect constitutional rights in the face of tensions to adjudicate such claims less vigorously in deference to local interests.
HI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM PARITY IN GERMANY
As discussed earlier, the judicially recognized status of economic
liberties is one part of the larger subject of protecting federal constitutional
rights. Reviewing this status in concert with shifts in views of state courts
as guardians of federal constitutional rights yields several conclusions. 227
Two particular problems combine to create a need for a structural change in
our judiciary system. First, the gradual and steady decline in the protection
of economic liberties in this country has been nearly unchecked for most of
this century. 22 Second, the debate is -at a standstill as to whether state
courts are willing and able guardians of federal constitutional rights. 229 To
resolve the debate, Professor Chemerinsky's litigant choice principle should
be adopted. Application of the principle would increase the protection of
all individual liberties, not just economic liberties, because the same vari-

223. Id. at 528.
224. Id. at 541; see supra note 164 (quoting the Article 14 protection of property).
225. See Jeffress, supra note 26, at 544.
226. Id. at 528.
227. See supra notes 28-79 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background
of the parity problem in United States).
228. See supra notes 28-79 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background
of the parity problem in the United States).
229. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (addressing parity in Germany).
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ables that cause disparity between state and federal courts in the level of
protection of economic liberties are present for other liberties. "3
It is doubtful that the political momentum required to bring about the
adoption of the litigant choice principle will come from analysis of parity
in the United States alone because of the inability to make conclusive
generalizations. However, the analysis of parity in Germany provides
insights for our own parity debate which, support the adoption of Chemerinsky's litigant choice principle.
A. SPECIFIC LESSONS

The German legal system has two central lessons that support the
application of the litigant choice principle. The first is structural in nature,
regarding rules of access to particular forums. The second is motivational,
a consideration of the political tensions which inevitably invade judicial
decision making as a result of the judicial structure. The lessons provide
solid support for giving litigants with allegedly violated constitutional rights
the opportunity to select the forum they believe will be most sympathetic to
their claims. Relevant aspects of the litigant choice principle precede each
of the lessons.

1. Structural Lessons
Implementing the litigant choice principle would significantly change
the structure of the rules governing the determination of forum. Again,
Chemerinsky specifically recommends three changes to civil litigation.
First, federal court jurisdiction could be based on constitutional claims raised
in a defense.2 ' Second, if the plaintiff has a constitutional claim and the
defendant does not, the plaintiff should be able to bring the claim in state
232
court without the defendant being able to remove it to federal court.
Third, where a plaintiff files in federal court but has no constitutional claim,
a defendant with a constitutional claim should be able to remove from
federal to state court.233
It is important to recognize that the application of Chemerinsky's
recommendations would impact the litigation of issues currently considered

230. See Joseph Becker, Comment, Procrustean Jurisprudence:An Austrian School
Economic Critique of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the Twentieth Century
United States, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671 (1995) (arguing the invalidity of distinguishing
between economic and "personal" liberties).
231. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 313.
232. Id. at 315.
233. Id.
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exclusively federal.2 34
' State courts already litigate matters considered
exclusively federal when the issues are raised as a defense, but because of
the rules of removal, such defendants are forced to litigate in state court.235
The litigant choice principle would allow defendants to decide if a state
court has sufficient expertise to hear the case. 236 However, a plaintiff with
a claim that is exclusively federal would still be required to bring such a
case in a federal forum.237 As a result of such structural changes, parties
with constitutional claims would benefit by the access to the forum they
believe most likely will protect their constitutionally protected interests.
In Germany, the availability of access to the Federal Constitutional
Court is a structural mechanism whereby a litigant, plaintiff or defendant,
may seek alternative adjudication of a constitutional claim. Thus, if a
resident of former West Germany has a claim on property in former East
Germany and is unsatisfied with the ruling of the local court located in
former East Germany, he may either raise an appeal in the respective court
or bring the matter before the Federal Constitutional Court. This second
available forum provides additional protection for the German litigant's
rights. This is precisely the same effect intended by the litigant choice
principle. The German approach is the same as Professor Chemerinsky's
first alternative in applying the litigant choice principle to criminal law,238
which would permit a defendant with a constitutional claim to interrupt the
litigation and present the other forum with the constitutional question.239
However, the American version would be even better than the German
because the parallel structure between state and federal judiciaries would
give the litigant additional opportunities for appeal.
2. Motivational Lessons

The litigant choice principle is premised on the belief that the existence
of an alternative forum creates an environment of competition for the
reputation of best protecting constitutional rights. State and local courts
would compete for the reputation of being the most fervent guardians of
234. E.g., Bankruptcy and patent law.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (specifying the rules for removal of cases from state to
federal court).
236. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 300-26 (presenting Chemerinsky's argument
for the litigant choice principle).
237. Id.
238. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing Chemerinsky's first
alternative for criminal cases).
239. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Constitutional Court).
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constitutional liberties. Ideally, this would be a perpetual situation,
eventually becoming an influencing factor in who sought careers in the
judiciary.
In Germany, the opportunity for a party to raise a Basic Right claim
with the Federal Constitutional Court perpetuates a similar environment.
The possibility that a party will raise a claim to the Federal Constitutional
Court if the state court does not adequately protect the litigant's constitutional rights acts as an incentive for state judges to aggressively defend
constitutional rights to avoid the embarrassment of being overruled by the
Federal Constitutional Court. This is the same effect that Chemerinsky's
proposal would have. In addition, the German state judges have the
additional incentive that their career advancement may be jeopardized by
developing a reputation of disregarding constitutional rights.2" Although
the attainment of a seat on the federal bench is different in the United
States, a state judge who seeks appointment to the federal bench also risks
such a goal by developing a reputation for failing to protect constitutional
rights.
B. FEDERALISM CONCERNS

Any changes in the relationship between state and federal courts in the
United States, by definition, invoke a consideration of federalism.24 t To
be adopted, the litigant choice principle must comport with contemporary
views on federalism.
Those concerned with the maintenance of federalism should be satisfied
with the litigant choice principle because it secures a role of protecting
constitutional rights for both the federal and state courts. 2 Presently, the
rules governing jurisdiction have limited that aspect of federalism. For
example, because a defendant can only remove a case from state to federal
court when the claim could have originally been brought in federal
court,243 a defendant may be forced to litigate a constitutional right as a
defense in the state court even though the federal court may be the preferable forum. In such a situation, the defendant's interests should be given

240. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
advancement for a German judge).
241. For example, the current political environment would not permit shifting the role
of the judiciary either state or federal forums to the exclusion of the lower federal courts or
the states.
242. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 300-26 (presenting Chemerinsky's argument
for the litigant choice principle).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (specifying the rules for removal of cases from state to
federal court).
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higher priority as the one alleging a constitutional violation. Thus, adoption
of the litigant choice principle would better protect individual rights'" and
would re-engage state and federal courts in the effort to maintain the
separation of powers by serving as checks on the power of the legislatures.'4
CONCLUSION

Florence Dolan's choice of whether to bring her takings claim either in
a state or a federal court was complicated by the number of factors which
currently must be weighed when making such a decision.2m Subsequent
potential litigants, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who believe that either
a municipal, state, or federal action has violated their federal constitutional
rights should have the opportunity to seek relief in the forum that thei,
believe will best guard their individual rights. 247 The effect of this choice
would certainly have an impact on state and lower federal courts as they
would be deterred from decisions which would give them the reputation of
being antagonistic towards constitutional rights.
The implementation of the litigant choice principle would provide all
of the individual liberties protected by the Constitution greater protection.
This would constitute a significant step towards the ideal of where the state
exists to preserve freedom. "How wise will it be in them by cherishing the
union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly
prized!""
TIMOTHY L. GARTIN

244. See Chemerinski, supra note 18, at 308.
245. Id. at 324-26. Chemerinsky states, "Just as the federal courts could provide
a
check against unconstitutional state government conduct, so could state courts
provide
protection against the federal government." Id. at 326.
246. Doland v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
247. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text (discussing specific recommendations).
248. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

